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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Eric Michael Ross appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to 
suppress evidence.  In the district court, he asserted that officers illegally prolonged his 
traffic stop and illegally searched luggage in the trunk of the car he was driving.  The 
district court denied the motion, and Mr. Ross entered a conditional plea of guilty to one 
count of unlawful possession of a firearm and one count of trafficking in 
methamphetamine, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. 
 This reply brief is necessary to respond to the State’s claim that Mr. Ross lacked 
standing to contest the search of a duffel bag found in the trunk of the car Mr. Ross was 
driving.  Mr. Ross asserts that he had standing to contest the search of the duffel bag 
because law enforcement illegally prolonged the traffic stop by unlawfully seizing the 
luggage in the car. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Ross’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES1 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ross’s motion to suppress because 
he had standing to challenge the reasonableness of his detention and the search 
of the car? 
 
2. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ross’s motion to suppress because 
the deputies unlawfully extended the traffic stop? 
 
3. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ross’s motion to suppress because 
Deputy Gorham would not let Mr. Ross take his luggage without searching it first, 
and the inventory search was not performed according to protocol? 
                                            
1 The State consolidated the issues and relied exclusively on the standing issue.  (Resp. 
Br., p.3.)  As such, Mr. Ross’s points on reply are addressed under the first issue from 
the Appellant’s Brief. 
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                                                           ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ross’s Motion To Suppress Because He 
Had Standing To Challenge The Reasonableness Of His Detention And The 
Search Of The Car 
 
 In its Respondent’s Brief, the State concedes that that there is no legal authority 
for law enforcement to “continue to withhold property from a suspect after the 
investigative detention has ended and the suspect is free to leave.”  (Resp. Br., p.9.)  
The State also acknowledges that while officers can temporarily withhold a container 
during an investigative detention, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that they cannot 
then open that container and search it.  (Resp. Br., p.9.)  However, the State argues 
that Mr. Ross lacked standing to contest the search of a duffel bag in the trunk because 
he disclaimed ownership in that bag before the “inventory search.”    
 While the district court found that Mr. Ross lacked standing to contest a search of 
the car under Cutler, it made no finding that Mr. Ross lacked standing to contest a 
search of the duffel bag because he disclaimed ownership of it.  (R., pp.198-200.)  It is 
clear from the record, however, that the deputies had unlawfully seized the luggage in 
the trunk before Mr. Ross said that the bag did not belong to him.  Therefore, even if 
Mr. Ross was found to have abandoned the bag, such abandonment was not voluntary 
as it was the result of illegal police conduct. 
After giving Mr. Ross a citation, Deputy Gorham refused to let Mr. Ross take the 
luggage in the trunk and freely leave unless Mr. Ross consented to a search of the 
luggage.  As such, Deputy Gorham illegally prolonged the stop. 
The conversation between Deputy Gorham and Mr. Ross—after Deputy Gorham issued 
the citation—went as follows: 
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DEPUTY GORHAM: Mr. Ross, go ahead and hop out for me.2 
 
MR. ROSS: Yes sir. 
 
DEPUTY GORHAM: You got your citation and everything? 
 
MR. ROSS: Yes sir. 
 
DEPUTY GORHAM: Any questions on that? 
 
MR. ROSS: No sir 
 
DEPUTY GORHAM: Alright, the rental car company wants us to tow the 
vehicle to the nearest impound yard, so we need to set up you guys 
getting a ride out of here somehow.3 
 
MR. ROSS: Okay, can we get our bags and stuff? 
 
DEPUTY GORHAM: Uh, we’ll get that for you.  I just want to make sure 
there’s no weapons or anything in them—no pistols, handguns? 
 
MR. ROSS: No 
 
DEPUTY GORHAM: Do I have your consent to get in there and get the 
bags for you? 
 
MR. ROSS: Why can’t we just grab them? 
 
DEPUTY GORHAM:  Well, that’s not safe for us to do. 
 
MR. ROSS: Are you going to tear them open and go through them and all 
that stuff? 
 
DEPUTY GORHAM: Make sure there’s no weapons in there, yes sir.  Yes 
or no, it’s up to you. 
                                            
2 As noted in the Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Ross sat in the front seat of the deputies’ vehicle 
while Deputy Gorham wrote out the citation.  (App. Br., p.21.)  
3 Mr. Ross already had someone coming to pick him up, and the deputies already knew 
this.  He made a call to a friend before he was issued his citation and then told the 
deputies that he had “either a driver or a ride on the way.”  (Video at 20:45 – 21:45.) 
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(Video at 25:15 – 26:30) 
 Once it was clear that Mr. Ross would not consent to a search of the bags—and 
a drug dog was not available to come to the scene—Deputy Gorham said the bags 
would be searched pursuant to an “inventory search.”  (App. Br., p.17.)  Then he asked 
if all the bags belonged to Mr. Ross, and only then did Mr. Ross say that one of the 
bags belonged to Mr. Hunter.  (Video at 37:00 – 37:30.)  Thus the only reason that 
Mr. Ross made that statement was because Deputy Gorham unlawfully prolonged 
Mr. Ross’s detention by illegally seizing the luggage.4    
This situation is similar to that in Florida v. Royer where the United States 
Supreme Court held that a defendant’s consent to a search of his luggage was tainted 
by the illegality of his detention because law enforcement seized and kept his airline 
ticket, driver’s license, and luggage.  460 U.S. 491, 504-08 (1983).  Similarly, in United 
States v. Place, the Supreme Court held that a seizure of luggage “can effectively 
restrain the person since he is subjected to the possible disruption of his travel plans in 
order to remain with his luggage or to arrange for its return.”  462 U.S. 696, 708 (1983).  
The Court went on to say that “when the police seize luggage from the suspect’s 
custody . . . the limitations applicable to investigative detentions of the person should 
define the permissible scope of an investigative detention of the person’s luggage on 
less than probable cause.”  Id. at 709.  The Court held that the seizure was 
unreasonable as the police had “exceeded the permissible limits of a Terry-type 
investigative stop” in large part because they detained the luggage for 90 minutes 
waiting for a drug dog to arrive.  Id. at 708-09. 
                                            
4 At the suppression hearing, Mr. Ross testified that the duffel bag belonged to him. 
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In this case, Deputy Gorham seized all the luggage and would not let Mr. Ross take it 
unless he consented to a search of it.  As counsel below put it, “this choice of search or 
abandonment took place at a time in which Ross had already been cited and released 
for DWP and had been told he was free to leave the scene on foot.”  (R., p.137.)  Thus, 
like the defendants in Royer and Place, Mr. Ross’s extended detention was 
unreasonable. 
Further, as argued in the Appellant’s Brief, the district court’s finding that Terry 
applied because “a reasonably prudent man would have felt his safety was at issue” 
was not supported by the facts.  (App. Br., p.21.)  But even assuming arguendo that a 
Terry-type detention of the luggage was reasonable, the State concedes that opening 
and searching that luggage was prohibited under State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730-31 
(2005).  (Resp. Br., p.9.)  Moreover, there is certainly no authority to support law 
enforcement making a “trade” where a person must waive his Fourth Amendment rights 
so that he can leave the scene of a traffic stop with the property in the car.  Here, 
Deputy Gorham actually wanted to open and search the luggage before he would let 
Mr. Ross leave with it.  As such, the seizure of Mr. Ross and the luggage was 
unreasonable.     
  A defendant who is illegally detained has standing to challenge the result of a 
subsequent search.  State v. Haworth, 106 Idaho 405, 406 (1984).  In Haworth, the 
Idaho Supreme Court held that passengers in cars have standing to contest the 
reasonableness of a traffic stop because the personal rights of the passenger are 
“infringed upon by the investigatory stop.”  Id.  Relying in part on Haworth, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals has also held that passengers in cars—despite often lacking standing 
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to challenge a search of the car due to their “non-owner” status—had standing to 
challenge the results of a search when the traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged.5  
State v. Luna, 126 Idaho 235, 237-38 (Ct. App. 1994).  In his concurrence in Luna, 
Judge Perry attempted to clarify the court’s reasoning to give guidance to district courts.  
He wrote, “If the stop, or as in this case the continued detention, of the passenger is 
invalid, then the passenger is indirectly being given standing to challenge the results of 
the search and to request suppression of the evidence as the remedy.”  Id. at 240 
(emphasis in original). 
 The State cites to State v. Harwood, 133 Idaho 50 (Ct. App. 1999), for the well-
established rule that “[t]here is no reasonable expectation of privacy in voluntarily 
abandoned property.”  (Resp. Br., p.7.)  Harwood, however, also made it clear that “[i]f 
the abandonment is caused by illegal police conduct . . . the abandonment is not 
voluntary.”  Id. at 52 (citing United States v. Roman 849 F.2d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 1988); 
United States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041, 1045 (6th Cir. 1982)).  Under Luna and 
Harwood, therefore, if a stop is unlawfully extended, and that extension results in the 
defendant abandoning property by disclaiming ownership, the abandonment is not 
voluntary, and the defendant continues to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the property and thus has standing to challenge the results of the search of that 
property. 
 In this case, Mr. Ross never disclaimed ownership in the duffel bag until well 
after the stop had been illegally prolonged.  The purpose of the stop was over when 
                                            
5 Here, Mr. Ross was obviously not a passenger, but he was in a similar position as he 
was an unauthorized driver of the rental car. 
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Deputy Gorham issued Mr. Ross a citation for driving without privileges.  (See App. 
Br., pp.14-17.)  Mr. Ross only disclaimed ownership of the bag after Deputy Gorham 
would not give him the luggage and then told him that he was going to perform an 
inventory search of the car and asked if all the bags in the trunk belonged to Mr. Ross.  
(Video at 37:00 – 37:30.)  Thus, there was a clear nexus between illegally prolonging 
the stop and Mr. Ross’s eventual disclaimer.  His disclaimer, therefore, was not 
voluntary, and Mr. Ross had standing to contest not only his detention but the results of 
the search. 
 In light of Luna and Harwood, the State’s reliance on United States v. Decoud, 
456 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2006), is misplaced as that case is easily distinguishable from 
this one.  (See Resp. Br., p.8.)  In Decoud, the defendant had been arrested pursuant to 
a warrant when law enforcement searched a briefcase that he claimed did not belong to 
him.  Id. at 1001.  Therefore, he was not wrongfully seized—nor was his briefcase— 
when he disclaimed ownership or when the search of the briefcase occurred.  Here, by 
contrast, the traffic stop was illegally extended when Deputy Gorham refused to give 
Mr. Ross the luggage, and that extension led directly to the disclaimer of ownership.   
The State makes no legal argument with respect to the illegal extension of the stop.  It 
simply asserts in a footnote that, “once the officers explained to Ross that the rental car 
would be towed (at approximately 14:13:30)6, the rest of the encounter was spent 
removing items from the car for Ross and his passenger and waiting for a ride to pick 
                                            
6 The State’s reference to the specific point in the video is not clear but appears to 
reference the events immediately after minute 25 as this is when Deputy Gorham told 
Mr. Ross that the car would be towed.   
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them up.  The officers did not prevent Ross and his passenger from leaving the scene.”  
(Resp. Br., p. 7, n.1.)   
As the video makes clear, the officers most certainly did prevent Mr. Ross and 
his passenger from leaving.  Contrary to the State’s assertion, after the citation was 
issued, the rest of the encounter consisted of Deputy Gorham preventing Mr. Ross from 
leaving the scene because Deputy Gorham would not give him the luggage unless he 
consented to a search of it.  The State concedes there is no authority to support such 
an action.  Therefore, under Luna and Harwood, Mr. Ross had standing to contest the 
results of the search of all the bags in the car and the unlawful inventory search itself. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ross respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s judgment 
and sentence, reverse the order denying his motion to suppress, and remand the case 
to the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 8th day of March, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      REED P. ANDERSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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